Showing posts with label Dartmouth Atlas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dartmouth Atlas. Show all posts

Sunday, December 20, 2015

Integrated Health Systems and Cost: The Price is the thing!

When the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was being developed, much emphasis was put on the effectiveness of integrated health systems as a way to save money but still deliver quality health care. Many studies from various research centers had looked at cost to Medicare and found that places – usually smaller cities – with large integrated health systems spent less on Medicare without noticeable decrements to quality. These systems can have a single provider of both inpatient and outpatient care (such as the Mayo Clinic) or close collaborations, including shared electronic medical records (as in Grand Junction, CO). The presumption of policy makers creating ACA was that Medicare spending, which is much easier to track, would reflect overall spending. However, a recent article from the National Bureau of Economic Research by Zack Cooper, Stuart Craig, Martin Gaynor and John Van Reenen, The Price Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured, demonstrates that this assumption was incorrect. Reviewing overall costs in the 306 Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs, developed by the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care) in the US, they discovered wide discordance between Medicare costs and overall healthcare costs. Indeed, many of the places that were highly-touted for lower-Medicare-costs-but-still-high-quality, notably Grand Junction, CO (which was, for example, cited as a success story by Atul Gawande in his June, 2009 New Yorker article “The Cost Conundrum”) have far higher than average costs overall. (Dr. Gawande has just had a new piece in the New Yorker discussing the implications of this new article.)

The New York Times coverage of this study, by Kevin Quealy and Margot Sanger-Katz, The Experts Were Wrong About the Best Places for Better and Cheaper Health Care (December 15, 2015), includes a terrific feature that allows interactive access to the data collected by Cooper and his colleagues. You can put in a town (really, HRR) and find out where it ranks in terms of both Medicare and private costs. Grand Junction, for example, while ranking 3rd lowest of the 306 HRRs for per-capita Medicare spending, was the 42nd most expensive for private insurance spending. Rochester, MN, home of the Mayo Clinic, is another city lauded for its low Medicare costs (14th lowest), but its private spending is 10th highest! McAllen, TX, cited by Gawande in 2009 for being #1 in Medicare spending (and now still #4) is only 140th in private insurance spending. Tucson, AZ, on the other hand, while only in the lower middle (82nd from the bottom) in Medicare spending, is 7th lowest for overall costs. The Kansas City region, where I live, was atypically near the middle for both, 142nd lowest for Medicare and 82nd  lowest for private costs. New York City is high in both, but it is 2nd for Medicare and 34th (quite a bit lower) for private insurance. The map in the article depicts HRRs as low, middle or high for both Medicare and private insurance.

So, what’s up? Were the experts trying to fool us? No, but the flaw  was the assumption that Medicare spending reflected overall spending. The data in this article demonstrates that it does not. It also reveals something about integrated health systems, especially those that dominate their smaller cities, given that some of the “top performers” for Medicare, like Grand Junction and Rochester, MN, were so high for private insurance. The integrated nature of these plans allows them to save money on patients by a variety of methods – they can be seen in ambulatory settings rather than in hospitals or ERs, and they share electronic medical record systems, and thus the information recorded therein, saving money by not having to repeat tests, x-rays, etc. This lower utilization is good for these health systems because Medicare is a relatively low payer, and because they can’t negotiate these rates – Medicare pays what it pays (it is a single-payer system, with minor regional variations). However, the same characteristic – being the dominant player in town – allows such integrated health systems to negotiate much higher rates with private insurers. Thus the mismatch; overall cost is a multiple of price for each service times the number of services delivered. These systems decrease the number of services for people insured by Medicare, for whom they cannot control the price (whether this does or does not decrease quality is a separate question) but they raise the price for services to people with private insurance. That places like Tucson and Kansas City have relatively lower prices for private insurance reflects the absence of a single large dominant system in those cities.

‘“Price has been ignored in public policy,” said Dr. Robert Berenson, a fellow at the Urban Institute, who was unconnected with the research’, in the Times article. Other health policy experts, such as Princeton’s Uwe Reinhardt, have been warning about this for decades. In the effort to pass the ACA, and please both providers and insurers, this point was in fact ignored, and it is the source of most of the common legitimate criticism of the ACA – that in many places decent health insurance policies bought through the health exchanges are unaffordable. With higher prices in these regions, insurers pass on the cost to their customers.  This is illustrated in the NPR story “Obamacare Deadline Extended As Demand For Health Insurance Rises” on December 18, 2015, which documents both the success of ACA measured by the large increase in the number of people signing up for coverage and their frustration at the frequently-high cost of this coverage. Of course, this is completely unrelated to the criticisms leveled at ACA by the Republican candidates for President and their allies in Congress, whose “solution” – abolish ACA – is Marie Antoinette-like. While the French queen is reputed to have said, in response to being told that the peasants had no bread, “then let them eat cake!”, Republicans, hearing that many people cannot afford health insurance on the exchanges even with subsidies, or get Medicaid in states (that they control) which have not expanded it, respond “let them pay out of their own pocket!”

The issues and solutions are clearly laid out by the reliably insightful Dr. Don McCanne is his “Quote of the Day” on this topic. A solution cannot come from a jerry-rigged program that allows either insurers or health systems or both to maximize their profit. It needs to come from a system that starts with price controls, most effectively by a single-payer system such as Medicare. There are, as he notes, still risks – mainly that health systems may under-utilize services when they cannot make profit, leading to lower quality of care. But we can guard against this both on the regulatory end, by measuring quality outcomes and holding providers responsible, and through the market because the incentive to not provide services to Medicare patients because they can be more profitably provided to the privately -insured (the “opportunity cost”) goes away.

The infatuation of both policy makers and providers for integrated health systems is not entirely misplaced. The potential savings from shared data and not repeating tests, and more importantly for caring for people in the most clinically appropriate setting (inpatient, ER, outpatient surgery center, primary care, long-term care) is a real positive feature of these systems. But to the extent that these providers are allowed to use their market muscle to raise prices to insurers which are passed on to beneficiaries, it becomes a real negative.

The key feature of a good health system is that it is not focused on balancing the financial interests of big insurers and big providers, but that it puts the benefits to patients, to the people’s health, first.

Wednesday, February 19, 2014

Integrating health systems must be to improve quality, not increase cost

The February 13, 2014 article in the New York Times by Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Apprehensive, many doctors shift to jobs with salaries”, more or less just presents the facts. It notes that the medical placement firm, Merritt Hawkins, says that 64% of jobs this year are salaried as opposed to 11% in 2004, and that it expects it to go up to 75% in the next two years. She cites AMA figures that “…about 60 percent of family doctors and pediatricians, 50 percent of surgeons and 25 percent of surgical subspecialists — such as ophthalmologists and ear, nose and throat surgeons — are employees rather than independent.” In some places it is more dramatic; in Kansas City, there are no longer any cardiologists (a type of internal medicine subspecialist) who are not employed by hospital systems, and oncologists (cancer specialists) are not far behind.

So, is this a good thing? The article suggests yes, but maybe not entirely. It states that “Health economists are nearly unanimous that the United States should move away from fee-for-service payments to doctors, the traditional system where private physicians are paid for each procedure and test,” and I agree, and that “When hospitals gather the right mix of salaried front-line doctors and specialists under one roof, it can yield cost-efficient and coordinated patient care. The Kaiser system in California and Intermountain Healthcare in Utah are considered models for how this can work,” with which I also agree. However, not all health systems are Kaiser or Intermountain Healthcare. The article continues: “But many of the new salaried arrangements have evolved from hospitals looking for new revenues, and could have the opposite effect. For example, when doctors’ practices are bought by a hospital, a colonoscopy or stress test performed in the office can suddenly cost far more because a hospital ‘facility fee’ is tacked on.”

Rosenthal has written about facility fees before, as has Alan Bavley of the Kansas City Star in his “Doctors, Inc.” series (“’Facility fees’ add billions to medical bills”, Dec 29, 2013), and I have commented on it in Changing the structure of health care delivery systems: to benefit the patient, the providers, or the insurers?, January 14, 2014. The new arrangements promise more money, or at least stable incomes, to physicians, and continue to pay the currently-most-highly-paid specialists the most money, with primary care doctors getting less. This is not because hospital systems have anything against primary care, but rather that they are following the money, and these acquisitions have occurred precisely while we are still under fee-for-service reimbursement in most locations. If cardiology or orthopedic or radiologic or neurosurgical procedures bring in great amounts of money to the hospital (“technical fees”) the hospitals like this, and are willing to share some of that money with the doctors to ensure that they keep their patients in their hospital or health system. Primary care does not generate such largesse. Relatively intelligent systems recognize that they need a locked-in “primary care base” to create referrals to their subspecialists, but will pay as little as they can, and demand “high productivity” (which could be seen as “patient churning”), and it is not just primary care: “many doctors on salary are offered bonuses tied to how much billing they generate, which could encourage physicians to order more X-rays and tests.”

Bloomberg News has a more direct take on this phenomenon, stating firmly in an article by Shannon Brownlee and Vikas Saini that “Bigger hospitals mean higher prices, not better care”, February 18, 2014. They cite data from sources such as the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care, a recent article in Health Affairs[1] which demonstrated that “On average, higher-priced hospitals are bigger, but offer no better quality of care,” and a variety of lawsuits by public agencies (such as the Massachusetts Attorney General) to demonstrate that hospital acquisitions are about market share and control of practices and, ultimately, about money, not quality. “If you think of value as some combination of needed services delivered for the right price, large hospitals are no better than small hospitals on both counts.” As I have written about before, doctors control a lot of costs in the health system, by choosing the tests that they order, deciding whether to admit to the hospital or not, and where they refer. By employing the physicians, hospitals can not only control the latter, but can set criteria requiring physicians to abide by hospital policies on the others. The doctors then become, in the words of this article,  “…another cog in the corporate machine, and many physicians have told us they feel they must skew their medical judgment to keep their jobs.”

This is the nonsense that occurs when things are done piecemeal. Intermountain Health Care and Kaiser are not perfect, but they have used their status as integrated health systems to control costs and increase efficiencies. To the extent that they are also the insurer, it is in their interest to do so. Efforts by the federal government to have others emulate these models through the creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs), without changing the manner of reimbursement, are bound to fail. As Paul Baladian is credited with saying “every system is perfectly designed to get the results that it gets.” If we are getting a system in which hospitals are buying up physician practices so that they can charge insurers, from Medicare to Blue Cross, more; if we are getting a system in which medical decisions are being made in the best financial interests of hospitals rather than the best health interests of patients; if we are getting a system in which we continue to favor some patient over others based upon their income, insurance status, or their type of disease (middle-aged well-insured person who needs a single joint replacement = “good”, older person with multiple chronic medical conditions and “just” Medicare or worse yet uninsured because they are under 65 or undocumented = “bad”), it is because we have perfectly designed it to be so.

Brownlee and Saini offer some suggestions for solutions. They suggest that Medicare expand its “Advance Payment Model,” a program that provides capital to small or rural physician groups, and also particularly about forming multispecialty Accountable Care Organizations driven by primary care.

“Until we give primary-care groups control over what happens to patients, large hospital systems and specialist-dominated groups -- those with greatest access to capital -- will be able to keep raising prices, even as they issue press releases about their plans to control costs and improve care.”

Sounds like a good idea to me. Combine that with a single-payer system that covers everyone, “everybody in, nobody out!” and we may be able to reverse the trend toward higher profit at the expense of lower quality.





[1] White C, Rechovsky JD, Bond AM, “Understanding Differences Between High- And Low-Price Hospitals: Implications For Efforts To Rein In Costs”, Health Affairs, January 2014 10.1377/hlthaff.2013.0747.

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