Showing posts with label skin in the game. Show all posts
Showing posts with label skin in the game. Show all posts

Sunday, February 28, 2016

Who is gaming the system? Surprise, it's the corporations!

I recently participated in a panel discussion following a presentation on the impact of the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) by UC-Berkeley economist J. Bradford DeLong. Unsurprisingly, Dr. DeLong, who worked in the federal government as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy in the early years of the Clinton administration, during an earlier attempt to pass comprehensive health reform, took an economic point of view. He described the economic theories behind each of the approaches to health reform, how the ACA was put together, how it most resembled the “RomneyCare” model implemented in Massachusetts and endorsed by Hillary Clinton but abandoned by the Republicans; he also showed that the Obama administration miscalculated the near-unanimity of Republican opposition. He also looked at how the implementation of the ACA has been more successful than many feared (or hoped) and how the economic analysis behind it was distorted by the Supreme Court decision to allow states to not expand Medicaid, which has resulted in an enormous transfer of wealth from the “red” states that have not to the “blue” states that have done so. Apparently, the ideological commitment by many states (including my own, Kansas, and neighboring Missouri) to harm its people and give away money is puzzling from a purely economic, as well as a human, point of view.
One of the themes Dr. DeLong notes coming especially from “conservative” economists and Republican politicians (and we hear a lot) is the need for people to have “skin in the game”, by which they mean co-pays, deductibles, and other ways of people paying out of their pockets. As Dr. DeLong noted, the only large, well-designed, and meticulous study of the impact of such “skin in the game”, the 1983 RAND experiment (which I have previously discussed; see Insurance company profits up and patient care down, May 17, 2011*)  showed that even small out-of-pocket payments discourage people from seeking care for both minor and major conditions, ultimately cost much more to care for, and harm the health of those people. As noted by one of the audience, current requirements in many “high-deductible” plans for “skin in the game” cost-sharing are far greater than those studied by RAND (and can be 45% of a person’s income!) and are thus even more likely to have a major negative health impact.
Another common “game” meme, mentioned by one of the other panelists, is concern with people “gaming the system”. If this conjures up images of elegant gamblers in formal wear playing roulette with James Bond in a posh casino on the Riviera, that is the intent. Like Ronald Reagan’s “welfare queens” and Kansas Governor Sam Brownback’s “able-bodied adults who refuse to work”, it is meant to divide people by creating a “them” who are taking it easy while the hard-working “us” pay the price. Of course, this is nonsense; most of those individuals so “gaming the system” are merely trying their best not to break their budgets paying for health insurance until they get so sick that they need it. Yes, this is certainly contrary to the concept of insurance (everyone pays and only some people benefit, but you never know when it will be you), and is a big reason that most countries have gone to a “social insurance” system that just covers everyone.
In fact, despite all the fooforaw about it, there is no data suggesting that there is massive “gaming of the system” by regular people. Michael Hiltzik’s Los Angeles Times column of February 27, 2016 makes this clear, focusing on “Special Enrollment Periods” (SEPs), times when people can enroll in or change their insurance outside of the usual ACA annual period. Huge insurance companies like Aetna and Anthem have asserted, without much evidence, that people are using these SEPs (mostly designed to allow changes when you get married, divorced, have a baby, move to a different state where your current plan wouldn’t cover you) to “buy to use”, in Anthem’s words, meaning you wait until you’re sick to get insurance. Hiltzik presents data that shows this is not significantly the case, and that it is absurd; he writes “Aetna must think the entire country consists of people plotting how to get a quickie marriage or divorce or have a baby just in case they get sick. The vast majority of SEPs cover a relatively trivial number of cases, unless you think there are hordes of people applying to become members of a Native American tribe after they get sick.”
Of course, people do game the system. But the big gaming is by the insurance companies themselves and the providers of care. These corporations, big insurance companies, health systems, drug makers, who have the clout to “game the system” do so all the time as part of their core business models. It is convenient for them to divert our attention to regular people, middle-class people, and especially poor people, as the ones gaming the system. In fact these are of course the folks who suffer the most harm, whose health is most affected, whose access to care is most limited, and who are stuck with crummy health coverage because this is all they can afford.
The insurers work every legal angle (and perhaps some not-so-legal) to figure out how to mostly insure relatively healthy, low-cost people (after all, 5% of people account for 50% of health costs and 1% for 20%, see my Red, Blue, and Purple: The Math of Health Care Spending, October 20, 2009, and Kaiser Health News report 2013),  while the high-cost patients are covered by Someone Else. Providers, especially health systems and hospitals, figure out how they can “upcode” to get maximum reimbursement from insurers, attract people who have high-profit-margin conditions to themselves, and encourage high-cost, low-reimbursement poor and poorly-insured people to find their care from Someone Else. Insurers blame providers for charging too much, providers blame insurers for paying too little. One of the other panelists, a hospital executive, complained about how insurers seek transfer risk, which is part of the definition of insurance, to the providers. Neither is blameless, and the other big players, pharmaceutical companies (and device manufacturers) make out like bandits, with no major candidate having a real plan to address this according to a report by Julie Rovner of Kaiser Health, (cited here by Medpage Today). Of course, this equates all plans to “negotiate prices” and it is obvious that a single-payer health plan, such as that advocated by Bernie Sanders, will have a lot more negotiating clout than the multiple-insurer mess that other candidates support and exists today.
What did I say as a panelist? Basically, that the goal of the system should be to maintain and improve the health of people, and that the economic design of the system should be designed to achieve that goal, rather than having competing economic theory be the driver, and people the incidental victims. I said that spending money on providing health care to people was not a bad thing, but spending huge amounts on “health care” when more than half was going to profit was. I said that all this spending on medical care (and profit) limited what was left to be spent on creating the conditions that allowed people to benefit from medical care – like housing, food, education – the social determinants of health.
I think that this resonates with people, both at the event and in the world. Or maybe I’m one of those “hopeless idealists”. If the alternative is being cynically corrupt, I wouldn’t want to be anything else.

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* Citations from that blog post: “RAND Health Insurance Experiment (as cited in Freedom abroad, health at home: experiments in preventive health care, February 13, 2011; the study was published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1983[1]; and it is summarized in an article by Joseph P. Newhouse, "Free for all?:  lessons from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment", RAND 1993.

Thursday, September 8, 2011

"The Doctor's Dilemma": Balancing needs of individual patients and responsible stewardship of health resources

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On August 25, 2011, in What is the ethical role for physicians in the "business" of health care?, I cited the commentary of Reuben and Cassel in JAMAPhysician stewardship of health care in an era of finite resources”. They identify the various levels at which physicians, physician groups, payers, and government can act to influence the cost/benefit of health care decisions. A similar issue is addressed recently by Victor Fuchs in the New England Journal of Medicine The doctor’s dilemma – what is appropriate care?[1] He notes that:
“…organizations representing more than half of all U.S. physicians have endorsed a ‘Physician Charter’ that commits doctors to ‘medical professionalism in the new millennium.’ The charter states three fundamental principles, the first of which is the “primacy of patient welfare.” It also sets out 10 ‘commitments,’ one of which states that ‘while meeting the needs of individual patients, physicians are required to provide health care that is based on the wise and cost-effective management of limited clinical resources.’ How can a commitment to cost-effective care be reconciled with a fundamental principle of primacy of patient welfare?”

He goes on to point out that some very expensive technologies benefit people while some do not or even cause harm, and many can benefit some people but are used too widely. He notes that, for example, “U.S. patients, on average, get almost three times as many magnetic resonance imaging  [MRI] scans as Canadian patients; there is no evidence that this large differential can be explained by national differences in the medical condition of patients or that it results in significant national differences in health outcomes.” This doesn’t mean that your MRI was not indicated, nor that there may be Canadians who did not get MRIs that were indicated, but it does mean that on balance we in the US are doing too many for the degree of benefit received.

Fuchs also addresses health insurance. He notes that, as many policy critics have observed, it is often not the patient but a third-party insurer who pays the bills (with the obvious, and glaring, and unconscionable, exception of the uninsured). Therefore, there is much less incentive on the part of the physician to not order expensive tests than if the patient were paying. I know this to be true. With underinsured or uninsured patients, especially in the free clinic I volunteer in, we minimize the use of unnecessary laboratory tests and maximize the use of generic medications on the “$4 list”. These practices are – or should be --  standard care in all patients. Working in the free clinic setting helps teach our volunteer physicians, as well as our volunteer learners, how to practice more cost-effective medicine. But it is not in itself enough. The free clinic still has major problems getting patients the care they need when they do need an MRI or CT, or a medication that is not available generically, or a specialist evaluation, or an expensive test (and for uninsured people virtually all procedures are expensive!), or a hospitalization.

So I also know that Fuch’s next point, criticizing those “policy experts [who]  think that if patients had “more skin in the game” — that is, had less insurance — the problem would be solved. It would not,” is correct as well.  He points out that even those who advocate this position agree there must be a cap on how much a patient should be liable for out-of-pocket (what? $5000?), but that “the extreme skew in annual health care expenditures, with 5% of individuals accounting for 50% of spending in any given year, means that many health care decisions, and especially those involving big-ticket interventions, will be made by and for patients whose costs have exceeded the cap.” The greatest expenditures are for people who need the greatest expenditures, and will be above any acceptable cap. Most people will not be, but most health dollars are not spent on the care of most people; they are spent on this small minority (which, as I have pointed out in Red, Blue, and Purple: The Math of Health Care Spending, October 20, 2009, any of us could join at any time!).

In a similar vein, policy pundits, many of the same ones who talk of “skin in the game”, talk about “freedom of choice” and allowing people to choose the kind of insurance that best meets their needs. Right. In Social Determinants, Personal Responsibility, and Health System Outcomes (September 12, 2010), I observe that all of those making such suggestions (the “Four Ps”: pundits, policymakers, politicians, and professionals) are not likely to be ever in the uninsured group. However, even they, even the doctors, have a difficult time figuring out insurance options. So imagine how it is for others, for most people? As highlighted by Lauri Martin and Ruth Parker in JAMA (“Insurance expansion and health literacy”)[2], for those who are less educated, for the 90 million Americans who have limited health literacy, choosing the “right” plan will be virtually impossible, a total crap-shoot.

What this means is that while large-scale comparisons, like MRIs between the US and Canada, can tell us there is something wrong, they cannot solve the problem. Nor can average expenditures of insurance companies, though again they can tell us a lot. But we must realize that we cannot solve the problem by limiting the individual access of individual people rather than attending to medically-appropriate guidelines that apply to all people. We need more fences, and fewer reins[3].

Ultimately, the contradiction between the commitment to the “primacy of patient welfare” and limiting the use of expensive technology is real, and the ability of physician organizations to put them into the same document without helping to explain how to resolve this “dilemma” is sloppy policy, and unfortunately often characteristic of them. Not just of physician organizations; indeed, given the scope of fine-words-with-no-action (or negative action) prevalent in the political sector, these physician groups are to be commended for calling for action. In “Dr. King weeps from his grave”, NY Times, August 26, 2011, Cornel West observes the same distinction between the actions called for and undertaken by the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and the words spoken by those who have built his memorial. “King weeps from his grave. He never confused substance with symbolism. He never conflated a flesh and blood sacrifice with a stone and mortar edifice.”

The conclusions of Dr. Fuchs, and of Drs. Reuben and Cassel, are not very different. We do not need words, or proclamations, we need system change. In Fuchs’ words: “…when physicians are collectively caring for a defined population within a fixed annual budget, it is easier for the individual physician to resolve the dilemma in favor of cost-effective medicine. That becomes ‘appropriate’ care. And it is an ethical choice… because if all physicians act the same way, all patients benefit.”



[1] Fuchs V, “The doctor’s dilemma – what is appropriate care”, N Engl J Med 18Aug2011;365(7):585-7.
[2] Martin LT, Parker RM, “Insurance expansion and health literacy”, JAMA 24/31Aug2011;306(8):874-5.
[3] Grumbach K, Bodenheimer T, “Reins or fences: a physician’s view of cost containment”. Health Aff (Millwood). 1990 Winter;9(4):120-6

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