Bezos, Buffett, Dimon and Gawande: Better quality in health maybe; a solution, no

A big item of health news in recent weeks is the planned establishment of some sort of health delivery operation by three major corporations personified by their CEOs: Warren Buffett of Berkshire-Hathaway, Jeff Bezos of Amazon, and Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan. We have no details about what it will actually look like, but we are assured that it will be high-quality, efficient, and cost-effective, utilizing the most modern methods of achieving those goals, which our creaky, antiquated, and resistant-to-change health system does not. It will also be non-profit, important given that none of these companies are, but this is the most common model for health care in the US and in itself says very little. As the first concrete step toward its creation, and clue to what it may be, they have appointed Dr. Atul Gawande as its CEO. Presumably he will be instrumental in creating this new venture, and his views on quality and efficiency may provide guidance on what might characterize it.

Dr. Gawande, a Harvard surgeon and senior writer for the New Yorker, has provided us a prolific body of writing in that magazine and in several books, (including the best-seller about issues occurring at the end of life, “Being Mortal”), to help inform us of his views. He has a wide scope of interest in health care and a demonstrated willingness to learn from other industries. Perhaps his most famous article is “The Cost Conundrum”, which appeared in June 2009 and highlighted the wide variation on expenditures by Medicare for similar populations, focusing on the highest cost region, McAllen, TX, and comparing it to a similar population in El Paso, TX, where costs were much lower. Later, in January 2011 “The Hot Spotters” highlighted the work of Dr. Jeff Brenner in Camden, NJ, and others, to use modern geo-mapping techniques to identify the areas with the highest levels of emergency (911) utilization (unshockingly, in Camden, the two highest were a low-income senior citizens housing unit and a long-term care facility) and try to develop methods for addressing their health needs before they became emergencies. In “Big Med”, August 2012, he discusses application of some of the principles that work in restaurants such as the Cheesecake Factory to health care. The principles include enough variety to meet everyone’s needs without expensive unnecessary redundancy; he shows how this applies in orthopedic surgery and how quality is improved and costs saved when every surgeon in a hospital doesn’t use his (or, more rarely among orthopedists, her) favorite implant device and there is some standardization (commented on in this blog on August 24, 2012, Quality and price for everyone: Bigger may be better in some ways, but not all). A very good review of Gawande’s work and probable priorities has been done by the outstanding Dr. Don McCanne in his “Quote of the Day” on June 22, 2018 “Don’t wait for Atul Gawande”, and I will not repeat it here.

Of course, the employees of Berkshire-Hathaway, JP Morgan, and Amazon already have health insurance, so that this new scheme will not reduce the rate of uninsurance. It is possible that it – whatever “it” turns out to be – will allow enrollment from other employers, or possibly even individuals who are currently insured by another mechanism, whether through Medicare, the ACA-sponsored exchanges, or even Medicaid. This will depend in part on what “it” is – mostly an insurance plan, mostly a care delivery system, or a combination of both like many HMOs.

It is possible that this new operation may indeed succeed in achieving, or at least significantly moving toward, the “Triple Aim” of higher quality, greater patient satisfaction, and lower cost. Certainly the third of these is a major focus of businesses that provide health insurance to their workers, and we will grant these people the benefit of the doubt that they also wish to achieve the first two. Some HMOs have had significant success in doing so already, most notably Kaiser Permanente. Other HMOs that were once “consumer cooperatives” (eliminate the middleman and pay less for the same care or the same for more and better care) have almost all been bought by insurance companies, and it is obvious that the “save money” (or really “make more money”) leg of the #TripleAim is of far greater importance to their business model than patient satisfaction or quality. The bar, as has been demonstrated ad infinitum, including in the work of Dr. Gawande as well as other policy analysts from

academia, the foundation world, and journalism, is so low that large improvements in quality can come from things that it is we already know how to do. The major obstacle to this has always been how providers are paid, and this is where the behemoth strength of this new triumvirate may have significant impact.

Unfortunately, though, there is no suggestion that this new operation would do anything to help those currently either frozen out of the system (including poor people in states that have not expanded Medicaid, undocumented people, and those who cannot afford insurance premiums even with ACA support). The average salaries at JP Morgan and Berkshire-Hathaway are high since so many of the employees are high-level finance types, raising the mean and median. However, Amazon is a different story. Jeff Bezos may be the richest person in the world, he did not get there by paying his employees a living wage; the median income for an Amazon employee is $28,446. While they may have health insurance, it would not be surprising if many of Mr. Bezos’ employees qualify for food stamps, and have difficulty making their copays; that median salary is about the poverty level for a family of four, and if it is the median, many workers make less.

It could be argued that is unfair of me to criticize a program – especially one still in the planning stage -- for not achieving what it does not set out to achieve. However, there is nothing wrong – and indeed it is quite correct – to note that it is far from being a health care panacea. By not setting out to ensure access for everyone, it will not solve the basic problem in achieving the Triple Aim. I mean, it’s good to be focusing on quality, cost and patient satisfaction but without a plan to assure that everyone has access to care it can ring a little hollow.

As was observed by Schiff, Bindman, and Brennan more than 20 years ago, and quoted by me before (Medical errors: to err may be human, but we need systems to decrease them, August 10. 2012), denial of care – or lack of access to care for financial, geographic or other reasons -- is the “gravest of all quality defects”.

Medical testing: is it about quality?

In her New York Times “Well” blog of April 13, 2015, physician Abigail Zuger comments upon “Quantifying Tests, Instead of Good Care”. She discusses a variety of factors that lead to physicians ordering more and more tests. In part, this is the simply the result of the advance of technology and thus the profusion of tests that can be done --  laboratory tests, imaging (like x-rays and their ever more complex cousins), and even parts of the physical examination (“Yes, little blood pressure cuff over there in the corner, that means you”) --  which sometimes can be seen as meaning they should be done. Other factors are about money. The tests cost money, a negative for patients and insurers, but they make money for the laboratories and imaging facilities and the hospitals which often own them, and frequently employ the physicians doing the ordering. Dr. Zuger notes that “Ordering tests, chasing down and interpreting results, and dealing with the endless cycle of repeat testing to confirm and clarify problems absorb pretty much all our time.”

Another impetus is our desire – patients and physicians alike – to find out what is wrong when there is something wrong. Or, when there is nothing really wrong, to perhaps prevent later disease by finding something hidden lurking inside. There are all these tests we can get! The patient may have had many of them before, ordered by another provider, or know people who have had them. They hope that something will give them an answer. The doctor may feel that there may be an answer out there that s/he might miss if a test is not ordered, or if s/he is a primary care physician that a specialist might order these tests so maybe we should do it first; after all, it sometimes seems as if one thing specialists do when we refer patients to them is order a bunch of tests that we could have. Or, and this is a big focus of Dr. Zuger, that their “quality ratings” may suffer if s/he doesn’t order these tests.

Quality ratings are measures of things that doctors should do (or, sometimes but more rarely, should not do) for patients with certain conditions or complaints; increasingly, insurers, employers, and third-party groups are assessing the quality of care that a physician delivers in this way. Are these recommendations not based on evidence? In many cases, they are. For prevention, the US Preventive Services Task Force assesses the degree to which tests may be indicated or not for different people, often based upon their age and sex. It gives them ratings: ‘A’ is strongly recommended based on good evidence, ‘B’ means there is some, but weaker, evidence to support doing it, ’C’ means there is conflicting evidence and patient preference should be taken into account, ‘D’ means not recommended (might even be harmful), and ‘I’ means insufficient evidence to assess. A smart phone app, ePSS, can be downloaded by anyone; put in age and sex and it tells you which preventive tests are recommended.

Of course, not all doctors do all the recommended screening tests, and frequently they do tests that are not recommended (e.g., PSA to screen for prostate cancer) or more frequently than recommended (Pap smears to screen for cervical cancer), or in people for whom the test is not recommended (mammograms in younger women). When it comes to diagnostic testing rather than screening, looking for the cause of something when the patient is actually ill, there is even less consensus, and often a prevailing attitude of “more (testing) is better”. One effort to combat this is the Choosing Wisely campaign begun by the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation. This campaign asked specialty societies to identify 5 or more commonly-done tests or interventions in their specialty that should not be done. However, the same recommendations are not always endorsed by every relevant organization. For example, the American Academy of Family Physicians recommends “Don’t do imaging for low back pain within the first six weeks, unless red flags are present.” Great, but neither the American College of Radiology nor the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, arguably the groups that could make money from this, has such a recommendation.

And then there is the risk. Some of the tests receiving USPSTF ‘D’ recommendations are more than not helpful; they can lead to harm, and this is even more true of the many potential tests that can be done looking for disease. Discussing the work of a collaboration at the Dartmouth Medical School that looks at the utility of tests, Dr. Zuger notes that such iconic treatments as controlling blood pressure can lead to bad outcomes in many older people where the benefits (avoiding stroke and other complications) begin to be outweighed by the risks:  “One study found that nursing home residents taking two or more effective blood pressure drugs did remarkably badly, with death rates more than twice that of their peers. In another, dementia patients taking blood pressure medication with optimal results nonetheless deteriorated mentally considerably faster. Yet no quality control system that I know of gives a doctor an approving pat on the head for taking a fragile older patient off meds.”

This is just the tip of the iceberg. Tests cost money, and often show results that lead to more tests, and then maybe to procedures (biopsies, for example) that maybe show abnormalities that lead to bigger interventions. And, sometimes these interventions are life-saving, but not always. Or maybe, even, not often.  And they do often have side effects, some of which are not insignificant. The person in whom a series of tests identifies cancer and is then treated and then survives is almost always grateful for the testing and the treatment, although in many cases they would have survived just the same with no treatment, and without the costs both in dollars and in side effects. The classic example is prostate cancer, where the evidence of any treatment making a difference in survival is weak at best; it is either a devastating disease from which one dies, painfully, or more commonly a benign condition that one dies with but not from but which treatment seems to have little influence on. Except for the cost, and the non-trivial side effects of impotence, incontinence, and the effects of radiation on the rectum.

Increasingly, data is showing that much breast cancer is similar. As discussed in my December 2012 blog post “More on mammography: just because you don't like the results doesn't make research junk science”, a large study by Bleyer and Welch showed that, with new and more sensitive mammographic screening, many more women are being diagnosed with early-stage breast cancer. However, despite treatment, we are not seeing anything like that reduction in late-stage breast cancer, which means most of those early stage cancers would not have progressed at all. And yet every woman diagnosed and treated sees herself as a survivor who has been cured, even in those cases where progression would not have occurred. In his wonderful recent New Yorker article “Overkill” (May 11, 2015), Atul Gawande notes that we treat all “cancer” as if it were rabbits in a pen who have to be chased down before they escape, when in fact many cancers are “birds” that have flown away and are gone before we can do anything and many others are “turtles” who are not going anywhere whatever we do.

The goal of medical care is now to achieve the “Triple Aim” of high quality, patient satisfaction, and lower cost. As with many things that come in threes, it is not that hard to achieve two but very challenging to achieve all three. Patients satisfaction is important, but not at any cost. Cost control is good, but not if it seriously limits quality. One place to start, then, is with quality, and specifically not doing what is useless or even harmful as assertively as we do what is likely to be of value.

And, of course, to make sure that it is the disease or risk of disease that determines what tests are done, not people’s insurance or socioeconomic status, ethnicity, gender or personality.

Quality and price for everyone: Bigger may be better in some ways, but not all

Atul Gawande, MD, a Harvard surgeon at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston, regularly contributes significant and provocative articles to the New Yorker under the head “Annals of Medicine”. In recent years I have written about several of these, including the “The Cost Conundrum”, June 1, 2009 (my comments in Medicare Costs: "All Politics are Local", June 11, 2009), “The Hot Spotters”, January 24, 2011 (Freedom abroad, health at home: experiments in preventive health care, February 13, 2011 and Camden and you: the cost of health care to communities, February 18, 2011), and “Cowboys and Pit Crews”,  May 26, 2011 (EMRs and Primary Care: The good, the bad, and the challenges, June 11, 2011 and Physician Oaths and Social Responsibility, July 11, 2011). His latest contribution, “Big Med”, August 13, 2012, continues his outstanding tradition of thinking outside the box, making important connections, and writing for a popular-but-educated audience.

“Big Med” starts with a visit to the popular restaurant chain, The Cheesecake Factory, and proceeds with his investigation into how it works and works effectively. This chain provides an enormous variety of menu choices, high quality both in terms of ingredients and taste (perhaps not the gourmet’s standard, but really good food), excellent consistency, and reasonable prices. It does not take a huge step to understand the relevant metaphors for health care, and in particular hospital care. Hospitals provide a huge menu of services, and we would all like them to be consistently of high quality and available at a reasonable cost. Unfortunately, they’re not. Gawande searches for how The Cheesecake Factory does it, and comes up with some excellent suggestions for health care.

He starts with the key ideas mentioned above: people should be able to go into a hospital and expect the best care and the best possible outcomes. These should be consistently delivered, and delivered at many locations (not necessarily every hospital for every procedure – to extend the analogy, The Cheesecake Factory has lots of restaurants, but not in every town) and done in a cost-effective way. While with restaurants, each of us knows what we like and whether something tastes good and whether we think we have gotten value for our dollar this is not true for health care. Most people (including physicians outside their own specialty) have little idea of what is quality in medicine. They can tell if they had a good outcome (“I’m better”), but not if it was the intervention that made it better, or perhaps just speeded up – or retarded – natural healing. They can tell if they had a bad outcome (or their survivors can), but not if this was unavoidable. (The current method we have for adjudicating this – malpractice suits – is entirely invalid.) They do not know if their outcome would have been better in a different hospital or with a different doctor or team, or even in the same hospital with the same doctor on a different day. They certainly don’t know whether what they, or their insurer, are paying is appropriate for the value.[1]

Gawande writes that “Big chains thrive because they provide goods and services of greater variety, better quality, and lower cost than would otherwise be available. Size is the key…We can bristle at the idea of chains and mass production, with their homogeneity, predictability, and constant genuflection to the value-for-money god. Then you spend a bad night in a “quaint” “one of a kind” bed-and-breakfast that turns out to have a manic, halitoxic innkeeper who can’t keep the hot water running, and it’s right back to the Hyatt. Medicine, though, had held out against the trend. Physicians were always predominantly self-employed, working alone or in small private-practice groups. American hospitals tended to be community-based. But that’s changing. Hospitals and clinics have been forming into large conglomerates. And physicians—facing escalating demands to lower costs, adopt expensive information technology, and account for performance—have been flocking to join them.”

He goes on to describe examples of how American medical care is changing, focusing on the experience of his mother getting a knee replacement at his hospital by a surgeon (not the most famous) who has organized a standardized system for delivering this care, using a (large) team. This surgeon has also accomplished the remarkable (to anyone who knows surgeons) feat of getting all the prima donna orthopedists at his hospital to agree to use the same prosthesis. The principle, just as in the casual dining area, is find out who does it best, identify the characteristics that make it so (removing the chaff and nonsense that may be associated but are just noise, often costly noise), and replicate it.

Applying this principle requires not only standardization, but size. Every hospital cannot be a mom-and-pop store, and the cost savings from scale are what make the whole thing possible. Yes, medical care cannot be completely reduced to recipes, and this can be a real danger. Individual doctors are different, and their skills are different not only by specialty or subspecialty, but in the way they interact with their patients. Some people may like a doctor who is older, or younger; a doctor who is a woman, or a man; a doctor who is more formal, or more casual. Some want a doctor who will explain things to them and elicit their beliefs and desires, and make them the educated “decider”; others want a doctor who is more didactic and authoritative. None of these is the “best” for someone who does not share those values; each is the “best” for those of us who do. The only caveat is when a particular approach actually makes a difference in the health outcomes for all people, not just those who “like” the doctor’s style.

Another danger in size and scale is that many of the processes and procedures that are put in place by these big, standardized organizations do not improve health outcomes, and may even limit them by taking time and energy from the things that do. Management in health care is still very much tied to “Motivation 2.0” (see “Drive”, by Daniel Pink[2], and my comments in The Primary Care Conundrum, August 18, 2012).  Many big food, or hotel, or hospital chains do not provide quality, and most certainly do not contain costs; see, for example, “A giant hospital chain is blazing a profit trail”, by Julie Creswell and Reed Abelson in the New York Times August 14, 2012, about Hospital Corporation of America (HCA). Like HCA, “big” is not a panacea, and can be a negative for social values and social justice.

Gawande includes important cautions:

"Yet it seems strange to pin our hopes on chains. We have no guarantee that Big Medicine will serve the social good. Whatever the industry, an increase in size and control creates the conditions for monopoly, which could do the opposite of what we want: suppress innovation and drive up costs over time. In the past, certainly, health-care systems that pursued size and market power were better at raising prices than at lowering them….

“The vast savings of Big Medicine could be widely shared-or reserved for a few. The clinicians who are trying to reinvent medicine aren't doing it to make hedge-fund managers and bondholders richer; they want to see that everyone benefits from the savings their work generates-and that won't be automatic….

"Our new models come from industries that have learned to increase the capabilities and efficiency of the human beings who work for them. Yet the same industries have also tended to devalue those employees. The frontline worker, whether he is making cars, solar panels, or wasabi-crusted ahi tuna, now generates unprecedented value but receives little of the wealth he is creating. Can we avoid this as we revolutionize health care?"

I don’t know, but I hope so. Holding on to old ways of doing things when they are not the best (or even very good), or the idea that each doctor can use a different prosthesis and they are all the best, is bad. Devaluing individual workers, whether they are physicians or technicians or cleaners, is bad. Developing ways of delivering high-quality care which is what both individual people and the whole society needs is good.

Good outcomes will certainly not come from the drive to maximize profit. To get truly good outcomes, we must put people and put social justice at the center of any change.

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[1] I love this part: “Historically, doctors have been paid for services, not results. In the eighteenth century B.C., Hammurabi’s code instructed that a surgeon be paid ten shekels of silver every time he performed a procedure for a patrician—opening an abscess or treating a cataract with his bronze lancet. It also instructed that if the patient should die or lose an eye, the surgeon’s hands be cut off. Apparently, the Mesopotamian surgeons’ lobby got this results clause dropped. Since then, we’ve generally been paid for what we do, whatever happens.”

[2] Pink, Daniel H, “Drive: the surprising truth about what motivates us”, Riverhead Books, New York 2009.